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T
here is only one
economic reason to join
the Euro – that it would
give us greater
prosperity. To prosper
you need to belong to a
large market, free of
tariffs and non-tariff barriers and
undisrupted by currency fluctuations.
That is how the United States grew
rich. Its huge market enabled firms to
specialise and produce on a massive
scale at low cost. At the same time the
size of the market increased the
competitive pressure on firms to be
efficient and widened the range of
suppliers from whom consumers could
satisfy their needs.
In Europe, the Common Market,
followed by the Single Market, has
produced some of the same effects.
But, as experience has shown, you
cannot have a truly single market
without a single currency. So the Euro
is the coping stone of the Single
Market programme, which Margaret
Thatcher did so much to promote.
And it is having its predicted effect.
We are now seeing a major
reorganisation of European industry
and finance, achieving the economies
of scale already seen in the USA.
It is easy to underestimate the impact
of currencies upon economic life. If
(like some monetarists) you believe
that money is a veil, it is natural to
believe that efficient markets can
penetrate the veil. But businessmen
know otherwise. If your costs are in
sterling and your receipts in a foreign
currency whose value fluctuates
against sterling, you will be far more
cautious about committing yourself to
the foreign market.
A good example of how this works
comes from Canada, which shares a
common frontier and a common
language with the USA but not a
common currency. Canada trades far
less with the USA than geography
would lead one to expect. A Canadian
province trades one sixteenth as much
with a US state as it does with
another Canadian province that is
equidistant and of equal income. And,
because Canada is so weakly
integrated into the US market, its
productivity is 20% lower than the
USA’s. Likewise, Britain’s productivity
per hour worked is 20% below that
on the Continent north of the Alps.
Among the reasons is our lesser
integration into the large European
market. That began with our late entry
into the Common Market and it
continues with our delayed entry into
the Euro. After the War, European
productivity per hour was way behind
the US, but the Continent has now
caught up with the US. Britain,
however, lags and has grown no faster
than the Continent over the last 20
years, despite our economic reforms.
The separate currency is a major
reason for this and it will become
even more damaging in the future. If
you have a separate currency, its
value will fluctuate. This creates
uncertainty about the return to any
long-term investment in export
markets. The returns in the foreign
currency are already uncertain and,
since the currency risk cannot be
hedged, this adds further to it. On top
of this, currencies go through
prolonged periods of misalignment,
which are deeply damaging even
when foreseen. The level of sterling
over the last three years has been
extremely harmful and is one reason
why firms like BMW, Vauxhall and
Corus are rebalancing their
businesses away from Britain.
Such misalignments cannot be
controlled. For, in the modem world of
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massive short-term capital flows, a
floating exchange rate does not serve
as a well balanced adjustment
mechanism, as its advocates claim.
Experience has shown that a floating
exchange rate produces much more
variation in competitiveness than
occurred in the Bretton Woods
period, when the exchange rate could
be fixed. As capital becomes ever
more mobile through electronically
linked financial markets, the exchange
rate is likely to fluctuate even more.
The simplest remedy is to link
ourselves to the currency of our
closest trading partners.
The argument would be strong in any
case, but it is even stronger when our
partners have already linked
themselves together. Before that
happened, we were in the same
position as any one of them. For
example, a firm that sold into
Germany faced exchange risk
whether it produced in Holland,
France, Italy or Britain. Now it faces
no exchange risk if it produces in
Holland, France, or Italy, but it does if
it produces in Britain. So the longer
we stay out of the Euro, the more
firms are likely to move their business
to the Continent. That is why so many
businessmen are urging the
government to join the Euro so that
they do not have to face that
agonising choice.
The key point is that, once the other
countries have linked up, we are no
longer in the same situation as
before. We cannot choose the
status quo ante. If we do not join,
we are in a worse situation than
before. So, even if we were happy
with our previous situation, we
cannot avoid a reassessment, now
that the Euro exists.
These are the central economic
arguments. But there is another
indirect one. Our economy is strongly
affected by what happens on the
Continent – by its level of economic
growth and by the regulations we
face from Brussels through our
membership of the EU. We want to
be able to influence these. We can
only influence growth in Europe by
belonging to the European Central
Bank, which sets interest rates on the
Continent. And we can better
influence European regulations if we
belong to the committee of the Euro
12 (the countries that belong to the
Euro). Increasingly, European
business is done within that group and
at present we are excluded from it.
That is the case in favour: to avoid
currency fluctuations, we must adopt
the single currency. But that also
means accepting the single rate of
interest on that currency. There lies
the rub: we lose control over our own
interest rates. So, if Britain faced a
shock that affected it differently from
other countries, it could not use
monetary policy to offset it. This is the
problem of “one size does not fit all”
and it is a serious disadvantage.
However, the same problem occurs
in the United States. If one region is
hit by an adverse shock, the Federal
Reserve can do little to help. Yet 
no one has proposed having separate
currencies for different parts of 
the US. 
So should Britain be as happy to use
the Euro as California is to use the
dollar? In this situation Britain’s main
drawback is that there is much less
labour mobility between Britain and
the Continent than there is between
California and the rest of the US.
Thus an adverse shock to Britain
would be harder to offset by an
exodus of population.
But there is also, of course, very low
net movement of labour within Britain.
Yet no one seriously advocates a
separate currency for the North-East
of England. Moreover, Britain has one
key advantage that California has not.
We have the freedom to run a budget
deficit. Though in the Euro we lose
our monetary weapon of stabilisation,
we still have our fiscal weapon. US
states have no such weapon, since
most of them have to balance their
budgets year by year. Thus, from 
the fiscal point of view, a European
country is better placed than a 
US state.
The opposite is often alleged. It is
said that California is better off than
Britain would be because, when
California’s economy plunges, it
gets an automatic transfer from the
federal budget in Washington. By
contrast, Britain would get no such
transfer from Brussels. However,
Britain does not need such a
transfer, because it has the
automatic stabilisers within its own
budget. These are stronger than
those in the US and Britain can, if it
chooses, use discretionary 
fiscal change on top of this to offset
a recession.
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There is one other point. The
California economy is very different
from the average of the US economy.
It is highly exposed to idiosyncratic
shocks, which the Federal Reserve
will not offset. By contrast, the
economy of Britain is more similar to
the overall economy of Europe than
the typical US state is to the
overall economy of the
United States. So
situations where our
interests diverge from
those of Europe as 
a whole should be 
relatively rare.
We must of course join the
Euro at a time when our
economy is at a similar
cyclical position point to the
European economy – i.e. when
we would like to have similar
interest rates. Sometime in the
next two to three years looks
ideal. But there are bound to be
times thereafter when British and
European interests diverge. 
That is the cost of joining in return
for the greater benefits of 
currency stability.
Let me end by reviewing some of
the less respectable arguments
against joining. First, there is the
argument that we should join the large
American market rather than the large
European one. In other words, join
the North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA), not the Euro. This is
absurd. For powerful economic
reasons, over 50% of our trade is
with the EU and only 16% with the
US. These powerful forces cannot be
bucked. Nor would the rules allow us
to join NAFTA and remain in the EU.
Second, there is the argument that
Europe is failing, so we should stay at
arms length. Europe has indeed one
serious weakness. France, Spain, Italy
and Germany all have higher
unemployment than we do. While
some of the difference is cyclical, an
important part is due to dysfunctional
benefit systems and rigid wage
structures, which need to be changed.
But joining the Euro does not mean
that we have to copy these countries.
Within the British single currency area,
the South-East has one third the
unemployment of the North-East. In
other words, the South-East has not
imported the unemployment rate of the
North-East. Within any single currency
area there will always be local
variations, but these are no reason to
break up the Union.
Third comes the argument that the
Euro would be a re-run of the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
On the contrary. The ERM was an 
ill-fated attempt to peg a separate
currency to other currencies. The
Euro is a decision to merge the
currencies so that exchange rates no
longer exist between them.
Fourth, perhaps the most strident
argument used against the Euro is
that it is the thin end of the wedge on
the route to a federal Europe in which
we shall be forced to harmonise
taxes and many other institutions
where we prefer our own variant.
There is in fact no such implication.
The Euro is a self-contained
arrangement concerning currencies.
Britain can continue to veto tax
harmonisation and most other
changes we dislike. This is governed
by the treaties we have signed, quite
irrespective of whether we belong to
the Euro or not. However, if we do
belong to the inner club of Europe, it
will in fact be easier rather than
harder for us to resist pressures of
the kind we disapprove of.
Finally, there is a common view
that, while we would be better off
inside the single currency, it is so
difficult to manage the transition
that we should not try. There are
of course formidable political
difficulties in persuading the
British people. But it can be
done. In the 1975 Common
Market referendum 55% of
voters were against
membership six months
before the referendum, but
only 33% were against it on the day.*
This time, the key conditions for
success will be strong business
support (which requires a reasonable
exchange rate) and a popular
government arguing clearly for a yes
vote in a referendum. If these are in
place, Britain will join the Euro sooner
than many people expect.
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